Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe
Volume 36

Issue 5

Article 7

10-2016

The Significance of the Role of Religion in the Bosnian Conflict of
the 1990s: The Town of Foča
Fo a as a Case Study
Louis Tozer
University College London

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree
Part of the Christianity Commons, and the Eastern European Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Tozer, Louis (2016) "The Significance of the Role of Religion in the Bosnian Conflict of the 1990s: The
Town of Foča as a Case Study," Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe: Vol. 36 : Iss. 5 , Article
7.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol36/iss5/7

This Article, Exploration, or Report is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ George Fox
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe by an authorized
editor of Digital Commons @ George Fox University. For more information, please contact arolfe@georgefox.edu.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE BOSNIAN
CONFLICT OF THE 1990s:
THE TOWN OF FOČA AS A CASE STUDY.

Louis Tozer

Louis Tozer is a graduate student in history at University College London, School of
Slavonic and East European Studies. His academic interests lie in the chaotic scenes war and
ethnic cleansing forced upon civilian populaces. His research and study has dealt primarily
with the break-up of the Former Yugoslavia and the Bosnian war, as well as the forced and
voluntary population movements in Poland that occurred during the aftermath of World War
II Currently he is researching the prosecution of sexual violence in war and why the ICTY
was the first court to successfully convict rape as a crime against humanity.

A common western stereotype of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the 1990s
is that it was the culmination of a deep-seated, subconscious ancient hatred between three
diametrically opposed and incompatible ethno-religious groups. These groups are commonly
defined by both ethnicity and religion, and they formed the main actors in this conflict. The
Croats are defined as Catholics; the Serbs as Serbian Orthodox; and the Bosniaks as Muslims.
The importance of religion in the conflict itself is a disputed factor, indeed, religion
seemingly took on a different understanding to that of theology and faith, instead referring to
one’s ethnicity. This is important in understanding how religion affected the conflict. Another
perception in the West was that the conflict was inevitable due to an orientalist opinion of the
Balkans as a war hungry region on the periphery of Europe, where ancient hatreds existed.
The following quote by Bill Clinton, the US president at the time, illuminates this
generalization: “their hatreds were five hundred years old.” 1 This commonplace opinion
implies that history had rendered it impossible for the aforementioned groups of people to
live together, yet they had done just that under a Titoist government, which largely sought to
1
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limit religious influence. Such a view also worked to legitimate a lack of intervention in the
conflict. However, after Tito’s death, and a widespread economic and political crisis in
Yugoslavia in the 1980s, religious institutions gained increasing political freedom and were
able to manoeuver more independently, enjoying a trend of “desecularization and increasing
religiosity.”2 The re-invigoration of religious institutions in the public sphere during the build
up to the conflict, coupled with clear attacks during the violence on religious symbols as “all
mosques in Foča were blown up and the ruins razed to the ground”3 indicates, how religion
clearly played at least some role in Bosnian conflict of the 1990s.
Religion is often a highly contentious subject and similarly the topic of religious
influence on a violent conflict, such as in Bosnia, can expect to be contentious and laden with
paradoxical viewpoints and theories. One such theory that can be disseminated from this
topic, is that of Michael Sells, a historical scholar of Islam, and his book The Bridge
Betrayed, which offers the opinion that the main cause of the conflict was a belief, in what he
calls Christoslavism. This notion of Christoslavism is explained as the belief that “Slavs are
Christian by nature, that conversion to another religion entails or presupposes a
transformation or deformation of the Slavic race,” 4 and that these, therefore deformed
Muslims, are essentiality traitors to their Slavic identity. This idea of Christoslavism is
imperative to Sells’ understanding of the religious aspect of the conflict as it is directly linked
to the targeting of Muslims by both Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbians. He is
unequivocal in his viewpoint that the war aims of the Croat and Serbian military forces was
the annihilation of the Muslim, cultural and social identity in the Balkans, as a form of
revenge. He believes this proves his theory of Christoslavism as it indicates the will to

2

Lenard J. Cohen, “Bosnia’s ‘Tribal Gods’: The Role of Religion in Nationalist Politics” in Paul Mojzes (ed.)
Religion And The War in Bosnia, (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1998), 51. (Hereafter, Cohen, “Tribal Gods”.)
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(Hereafter, “Kunarac et al. Judgment summary”.)
4
Michael Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion And Genocide In Bosnia, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
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cleanse the Balkans of so called “race traitors,”5 who are the Muslims who had betrayed their
Christian origins during the Ottoman rule. This is a rather simple explanation for what is
undeniably a very complex conflict, and Sells’ theory has one standout pitfall. In claiming his
theory of Christoslavism, he does not offer an explanation for the conflict between the
Catholic Croats and Serbian Orthodox Serbs, nor the short-lived alliance between Croats and
Bosniaks. One simple example of this, can be found in Mostar, where Serbs were driven out
by a Croat and Bosniak alliance, before “the two communities which were roughly equal in
size, turned against each other,” 6 before reaching a peace agreement in 1994. Sells’ also
seemingly ignores the geopolitical aims of those who orchestrated the myths that caused
interreligious tensions and violence. This illuminates how Sell’s notion of an essentialist
conflict between Christians and Muslims, as per his idea of Christoslavism, does not fit the
nature of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Sells’ idea that Christoslavism can explain the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina fails to
deal with the vast complexities involved. Those complexities are acknowledged by Paul
Mojzes, who makes clear that he believes the conflict was one influenced by a wide range of
factors. Mojzes claims that religion was just one of the following important factors:
“contemporary economic, social, religious, and political as well as ancient hatreds,”7 which
combined to form the causation of the conflict. He also references that in relation to the
conflict, religion lost its understanding as a theology and as practise of faith, but instead
became codified as a form of ethnicity and culture. In understanding this Mojzes coins the
term ethnoreligiosity, defined as “a specific symbiotic merger of one’s ethnic and religious
heritage as a means of providing a sense of personal and collective identity.”8 As socialism
crumbled in Yugoslavia during the economic and political crisis of the 1980s, religious
5

Sells, Bridge, 144.
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institutions unevenly regained varying degrees of autonomy from the government. This
coupled with a loss of socialist identity, rendered some people to re-identify with religion. He
states this led to rivalries between religious groups as claims of inequality were made
regarding economic benefits. Mojzes believes theses rivalries fostered feelings of groupness,
and in a region where language and appearance were generally very similar between nations,
religion became the most obvious and important marker of identity. Mojzes claims that
religion as a form of identity was unaffected by the practise of religion, but was determined
by a person’s cultural and familial lineage which constructed a person’s ethnicity and
therefore religious identity. This offers a more encompassing theory for the conflict in
Bosnia-Herzegovina than Sells’ theory as it attempts to explain the close relationship
between religion and ethnicity. This close alignment of religion and ethnicity offers a strong
argument for why religious symbolism was a reoccurring theme in the conflict, yet it also
generalizes that entire nations were overcome with this sense of rivalry, leading to escalating
tensions and a revision to previously common identities and cultural markers. Thusly, this
ignores such instances of inter-religious community spirit and the five percent 9 who
continued to identify as Yugoslav. A pertinent example of this can be found in the anti-war
demonstrations that took place in Sarajevo in the build up to the conflict, as well as the
ethnically Serb Sarajevo population who remained during the siege.
A slightly different theory, elucidated by Vjekoslav Perica in 2003 delivered the term
ethnoclericalism into the Bosnian conflict debate, in reference to a combination of “ethnically
based nationhood and a ‘national church.’”10 This means that national church leaders would
play an important role in the nation and therefore the government, a very different
proposition from the secular government that existed during the Socialist Republic of

9

Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005),366. (Hereafter, Mann, Democracy.)
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Yugoslavia. Essentially, Perica states that religious institutions took it upon themselves to
strongly emphasize the ethnic element of their institution, claiming that “national churches
became hallmarks of nationhood.”11 Perica strongly believes that the national churches in
Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina acted more as self-serving nationalistic ideologues,
than as theology based religious organisations. This theory relates to the significance of
religion in the conflict, because church structures pushed a nationalist and anti-secular agenda
into political discourse. For instance, the Serbian Orthodox Church repeatedly brought the
WWII Jasenovac Ustasha death camp to the forefront of public debate, implying that it was a
Catholic supported camp for the death of ethnic Serbs and therefore Orthodox followers;
thusly stirring interreligious tensions in public debate. This supported a constructed narrative
of genocide of the Serbian people through myth, constructing victimhood and martyrdom as a
part of the Serbian people’s story. In addition to this, in 1990 the Serbian Orthodox Holy
Synod held many commemorations of the Second World War, “with special emphasis on
Serbian Orthodox Church causalities during the war in the Independent State of Croatia,”12 as
well as demanding that the Pope visit Jasenovac and commit “an act of repentance.” 13
Perica’s theory is clear, the overt use of religious symbolism via commemorations, the
turning of Jasenovac into a holy site; demands for a papal apology for Serbs death at
Jasenovac; and the mass celebration of the 600 year anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, are
examples of the Orthodox Church behaving as a nationalist organization. By doing so, the
church abetted and legitimized the violence that ensued in Bosnia in the 1990s. Perica’s
theory implies that the ramping up of tensions in the prelude to conflict in the 1990s, was
initiated by the Orthodox Church, and its increased public nationalist rhetoric, and that this

11

Ibid., 215.
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“extremist Serbian kind of ethnoclericalism affected Croatian Catholicism and Bosnian Islam
and eventually was espoused by their leaders.”14
Ethnoclericalism offers a compelling argument for understanding why religious
symbolism was so prevalent during the Bosnian crisis. It explains how religious institutions,
through the embellishment of their importance to national identity, helped to instigate the
conflict. This is true because it pushed nationalistic narratives on the public as each of the
three religious groups involved sought out greater political privilege and feared the growing
privilege of the other. It seems highly agreeable that the way religion created a national
identity via ethnoclericalism; played a significant role in the conflict as the increased
nationalist rhetoric would have increased interethnic tensions, particularly through the
Orthodox churche’s stream of Jasenovac and Serb genocide references. However, in creating
the image of religious institutions as being only religious in name, instead acting as
nationalist movements, Perica invites scepticism. This is because it seems unlikely that
religious leaders were defaming other religious groups for purely nationalist motives with the
intent to incite violence. Religious institutions were attempting to carve out a more prominent
role for their church in the new political climate. Yet, political leaders who exaggerated
ethnic differences manipulated this rise in religious discourse. This is illuminated by Radovan
Karadžić who said himself “the church is highly important for all Serbs, and it is irrelevant
whether one believes in God or not,”15 highlighting how politicians saw religion as no longer
referring directly to religious faith, but as a political instrument with which to mobilize
populations. Perica essentially makes clear that in Bosnia identity became convoluted and
religion no longer merely referred to one’s faith, instead it referred to ones traditional and
cultural heritage and it was used to identify people, regardless of whether that person saw
themselves in such a way.
14
15
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Another historian who has concerned himself with the significance of religion in the
Bosnian conflict is Mitja Velikonja, whose theory holds, in some senses a resemblance to that
of Mojzes and Perica. Instead of attempting to coin a new term that could be broadly used to
define the religious significance, he has instead drawn the conclusion that religious
significance is itself limited, and filled with hypocrisies. He makes clear that he considers the
conflict to lack any real religious motivation and was instead a “classical war of aggression
with clear geopolitical goals.” 16 However, he understands that belligerents used religious
symbolism and rhetoric plentifully and that the religious leaders “failed to condemn incidents
that they themselves sometimes incited,” summarized as “hate silence.” 17 Essentially,
Velikonja argues that religious organizations allowed themselves to support the conflict, as
aims regarding increased political privilege and governmental influence were considered
inextricably linked to that of the nationalist belligerents. The religious organizations actively
allowed their symbols to support the conflict, as “religion and ancient myths gradually and
intentionally became an important means of national and political mobilization.”18 Velikonja
goes on to explain that even though many religious leaders, during or after the conflict
publically declared their support for peace and a reconciled multi-religious BosniaHerzegovina, they were in many cases the same leaders who had previously “tried to justify
violence, religio-national homogenization, ethnic cleansing and just wars,” 19 therefore
making them hypocrites. Velikonja considers religion itself, in a pure sense, to have had very
little significance in the conflict itself other than as a source of mobilization potential for the
belligerents. Yet, instead of simply implying that religion was manipulated by nationalists,
which he does state, he also believes that religious organizations similarly manipulated

16

Velikonja, Religious Separation, 292.
Ibid., 293 (refers to both quotes in the sentence).
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Velikonja, Religious Separation, p. 262.
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nationalist groups for their political aims, as “religious institutions lent legitimacy to and
opened perspectives for chauvinist politics, and vice versa.”20
Velikonja’s theory of mutual exploitation to reach political and geopolitical goals is
convincing, as it seems clear that religion offered a form of legitimacy of the violence, and
religious organizations saw themselves as benefactors from the violence. For instance,
politicians exploited ancient myths, purported by religious institutions, as Serb politicians
often referenced the time of Ottoman rule over Serbia; in a manner that focused on the
subjugation of the Serbs under a dominant Muslim ruling class. This was used to mobilize
Serbs against Balkan Muslims. These ancient myths were appropriated by politicians from
religious institutions to fuel rumors, such as in Foča where it was spread by nationalists that
the “Muslims planned to transform their town into a new Mecca.”21 This helped exaggerate
tensions between ethno-religious groups, regardless of how unlikely the claim was and
legitimize violence. Velikonja’s theory is so poignant because it explains how this mutual
exploitation between politicians and religious leaders, was extremely powerful in mobilizing
and influencing individuals to commit acts of violence. However, no matter how false the
religious motives may be in terms of non-religious people using religion to justify criminal
acts; the use of religion to manipulate people to commit violence renders religion significant.
In 1991 the census of the town of Foča, situated in Eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina,
recorded that of a population of 40,000 “51.6 percent were Bosniak, 45.3 percent were
Bosnian Serbs, and 3.1 percent other,”22 showing a borderline equal division of Bosniaks and
Bosnian Serbs cohabiting. However, during the conflict this was altered considerably. On the
7th April 1992 a Bosnian Serb led military attacked Foča taking full control of the town after
nine days, after which a dramatic campaign of ethnic cleansing took place, leaving a Bosniak
20

Ibid, p. 288.
Ibid, 245.
22
Human Rights Watch. Bosnia and Hercegovina "A Closed, Dark Place": Past and Present Human Rights
Abuses in Foca.10, No. 6 (D). (New York, London: Human Rights Watch, 1998), 12. (Hereafter, Human Rights
Watch, Bosnia).
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population of ten23 in post-Dayton Foča. The campaign of cleansing in Foča took on a stark
religious element and tone as referenced by the ICTY which detailed not only the
aforementioned destruction of all mosques in Foča but also that the designated purpose of the
campaign was “to cleanse the Foča area of Muslims(…)even the town’s name was
cleansed.”24 The name Foča was replaced, until international pressure forced its return, by
Srbinje, which translates as “the place of the Serbs;”25 explicitly stating the war aim in Foča.
Additionally, a seemingly clear policy of ensuring the Muslim population left Foča took
place, via the creation of mass fear through stark violence and the creation of detention
camps. The ICTY states during this time various forms of torture, inhumane conditions,
beatings, rape and murder were common. The Bosniaks were targeted, according to the
Bosnian Serb Dragoljub Kunarac, a commander in the Bosnian Serb army in Foča, who was
later found guilty of torture, rape, and enslavement; because of the need for ‘”gaining
supremacy” over the Muslims. 26 Even though we can assume that the accused would be
trying to limit his accountability in court, it still makes clear that those who he targeted were
Muslims; we can thus infer the Bosnian Serb military in Foča did likewise. Even though
Muslim was the demographic term used for Bosniak, it still implies that religion was the
dominant marker for who was to be subjected to inhumane treatment, as illuminated by
Mojzes’ theory that religious heritage and ethnicity had merged. Additionally if the accused
was willing to discuss the urge to gain supremacy over the Muslims in an international
courtroom, then we can infer that this was a diluted stance because the accused would surely
play down any anti-Muslim sentiment he may harbor when questioned in court; further
highlighting how strong anti-Muslim sentiments may have been in Foča.

23

ICTY, Judgment, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al. Case No.: IT-96-23/1, 22 February 2001, para. 47. (Hereafter,
‘Kunarac et al. Judgment’.)
24
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25
J.M. Selimović, “Challenges of Postconflict Coexistence: Narrating Truth and Justice in a Bosnian Town”
Political Psychology 36, 2015, 2:.238. (Hereafter, “Challenges.”)
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In Foča male and female Bosniaks were divided into separate camps such as KP Dom
for males, in which beatings and murder were common, and Foča High School and the
Partizan Sports Hall in which women and girls were systematically raped. This population
divide and their following treatment allows us to understand why so few Bosniaks were left
in Foča by the end of the conflict. Foča offers an example of violence and practically
complete and successful ethnic cleansing, that the later Srebrenica massacre in 1995 does not.
The events in Foča took place very early on in the Bosnian conflict, proving that the
immediate and clear attempts to rid Foča of all Bosniaks was indicative of Bosnian Serb and
Serb wider war aims. Furthermore the events of Foča became significant later for the ICTY,
as the Kunarac et al case in Foča saw the first successful conviction of rape as a crime against
humanity and as a war crime. This is vital in understanding the significance of religion as it
showed how the humiliation and degradation of Muslims was a clear policy.
The following quote offers a deeply emblematic insight into the religious nature of the
violence that took place in Foča, as during an incident of rape a Bosniak woman claimed that
the following was said to her: “You will see you Muslim. I am going to draw a cross on your
back. I’m going to baptise all of you. You’re now going to be Serbs.”27 This event described
by Witness 51 at the ICTY, occurred at a house she was taken to from the Partizan Sports hall
where she was repeatedly raped. Coincidentally this occurred on the night that the Aladža
Mosque, the most prominent mosque in Foča was destroyed. This quote helps compound the
theory that religion no longer took on just religious sentiment, but that it also clearly
registered as an ethnic measurement. When the man in question threatens to baptize the
woman he implies that the result of the baptism will be the conversion of the Bosniak woman
into an Orthodox, and that this will automatically register her as a Serb. This is a very
pertinent example of Paul Mojzes theory of ethnoreligiousity, as it shows how the lines

27
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between religious faith and ethnicity were particularly convoluted. Additionally, it can be
used as invocative of the wider violence and destruction in Bosnia as it illuminates the desire
among the nationalist paramilitaries and other organizations for complete homogeneity. This
illuminates how the power of religious rhetoric originating from the churches and the
advancement of this rhetoric politicians into nationalist policies, affected the agency of
individuals in the conflict, and their apparent motives.
Using Foča as a case study allows us to uncover how religion was used to create fear
in order to mobilize violence as it was claimed Foča was “under threat of a Muslim
fundamentalist coup;”28 this corroborates with wider feelings of national Serb victimhood.
Religious leaders like Arch-priest Dragan Terzić incited feelings of religious persecution,
through claims that Serbs had long been oppressed and brutally subjugated, and questioned
“whether the rest of the Serbs would stand by and watch.”29 This pushed communities apart
and hardened political loyalties along ethnic and religious lines. Additionally, it implies the
need for ethnic Serbs to raise arms in the apparent defense of their religious heritage across
the region. Witnesses at the ICTY from Foča, and indeed other trials, regularly reference that
the accents of aggressors were of Serbian descent, as witness 192 explained that when
soldiers selected women to rape that they were from Serbia and Montenegro as “one could
recognise them by their accent, by the way they spoke.”30 Although locals were also involved
in violence, as evidenced by the case of Dragan Zelenović, it does also suggest that religious
leaders and their calls to arms did have a material affect on the ground. In this sense religion
was important as it formed the backbone of these political loyalties, giving nationalist
politicians who reference religion a support base. Religious persecution was proved by the
ICTY, as “the imprisonment and confinement of non-Serbs at the KP Dom was carried out

28
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with the intent to discriminate on religious or political grounds.”31 The reasoning for this
persecution originates in the political differences, in relation to secession from or remaining
in Yugoslavia, and the territorial land grab that followed. Political stances in this sense were
largely defined by people’s religious heritage and ethnicity, and political leaders benefitted
from this by utilizing “religion as an instrument for generating élan and political support,”32
highlighting how religion had become entwined by the politics of the conflict.
Religion certainly played a role in the Bosnian conflict, as was made plain from the
above. Its significance lay primarily in how religion became heavily connoted with ethnic
identity and nationhood. It seems clear that one’s nationhood became very important in terms
of identity and political stance, whilst socialist Yugoslavia fell apart. Politicians and religious
leaders used religion as an instrument to mobilize and influence, as both used emotive
language to instil religion as a part of culture and therefore to demarcate others, and mobilize
religious fundamentalists and nationalists. This is vital in understanding the desecration of
religious symbols during the conflict, as mosques came to stand for the Bosniak ethnicity and
the political claims of the SDA (Stranka Demokratske Akcije, a predominantly Muslim
party), and vice versa with Orthodox and Catholic symbols. Religious significance therefore
lies in the manipulation of religious elements of society for overall political gains.

31
32
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